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Abstract—Fundamental results on secret sharing schemes
(SSSs) are discussed in the setting where security and share size
are measured by (conditional) min-entropies.
We first formalize a unified framework of SSSs based on
(conditional) Re´nyi entropies, which includes SSSs based on
Shannon and min entropies etc. as special cases. By deriving
the lower bound of share sizes in terms of Re´nyi entropies based
on the technique introduced by Iwamoto–Shikata, we obtain the
lower bounds of share sizes measured by min entropies as well
as by Shannon entropies in a unified manner.
As the main contributions of this paper, we show two existential
results of non-perfect SSSs based on min-entropies under several
important settings. We first show that there exists a non-
perfect SSS for arbitrary binary secret information and arbitrary
monotone access structure. In addition, for every integers k and
n (k ≤ n), we prove that the ideal non-perfect (k, n)-threshold
scheme exists even if the distribution of the secret is not uniformly
distributed.
I. INTRODUCTION
A secret sharing scheme (SSS) [1, 2] is one of the most
fundamental primitives in cryptography. In SSSs, a secret in-
formation is encrypted into several information called shares,
each of which has no information on the secret in the sense of
information theoretic security. Each share is distributed to a
participant, and the secret can be recovered by collecting the
shares of specified set of participants called a qualified set.
In a narrow sense, information theoretic security implies so-
called perfect security [3]. For instance, SSSs require that no
information can be obtained by the non-qualified set of par-
ticipants, called a forbidden set, even if they have unbounded
computing power. Letting S and VF be the random variables
corresponding to the secret and the set of shares of a for-
bidden set F , respectively, this requirement is mathematically
formulated as H(S|VF) = H(S) where H(·) and H(·|·) are
Shannon and conditional entropies, respectively. Namely, the
random variables S and VF are statistically independent.
On the other hand, another milder and optimistic scenario is
studied to define the information theoretic security: Suppose
that an adversary can guess a plaintext only once. Then,
the best way to do this is guessing the plaintext with the
highest probability given the ciphertext. Merhav [4] studied
the exponent of this kind of success probability in guessing
for symmetric-key cryptography with variable-length keys1 in
asymptotic setup. Recently, Alimomeni and Safavi-Naini [5]
1In this symmetric-key cryptography, each key depends on the ciphertext,
and hence, its length can be varied depending on the ciphertext.
and Dodis [6] revisited the same scenario for the symmetric-
key cryptography with fixed-length keys such as Vernam cipher
[7] in non-asymptotic setup. The security criteria in [5, 6] are
based on min-entropy and its conditional version since the
min-entropy is defined by negative logarithm of the highest
probability in a probability distribution. Under such security
criteria, the lower bounds of key length are discussed in [5,
6].
In this paper, we are interested in SSSs by using (condi-
tional) min-entropies, and clarify their fundamental results.
Particularly, we investigate the lower bounds of share sizes,
and the constructions of SSSs based on min-entropies.
In order to derive the lower bounds of share sizes in terms of
min-entropies, we take the similar strategy developed recently
by Iwamoto and Shikata [8]. Namely, we first formalize
a unified framework of SSSs based on (conditional) Re´nyi
entropies, which includes SSSs based on Shannon and min
entropies etc., as special cases. Then, by deriving the lower
bound of share sizes in terms of Re´nyi entropies, we can obtain
the lower bounds of share sizes measured by Shannon and min
entropies in a unified manner.
Then, we show two existential results on SSSs based on
min-entropies. Noticing that SSSs satisfying perfect security
also satisfy the security criteria based on min-entropies, we
are particularly interested in so-called non-perfect SSSs [9–
11] while they are secure in the sense of min-entropies. As a
result, we clarify the following two fundamental facts:
The first result is on the existence of SSSs with general
access structures. In SSSs satisfying perfect security, Ito,
Saito, and Nishizeki [12] proved the well known result that
SSSs can be constructed if and only if the access structure
satisfies a certain property called monotone. Combining this
result with the one by Blundo, De Santis, and Vaccaro [13],
this existential result can be extended to the case of arbitrary
distribution of secret information. Inspired by these results,
we will clarify that we can always construct non-perfect
SSS based on min-entropies for arbitrary monotone access
structures and arbitrary binary probability distribution of the
secret.
The second result is on the optimality of SSSs based on
min-entropies. In SSSs with perfect security, SSS is called
ideal if H(S) = H(Vi) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Note that the
ideal SSS only exists only in the case where S is uniformly
distributed [13]. In this case, R∞ (S) = R∞ (Vi) obviously
holds since Shannon and min entropies coincide for uniform
distributions. Hence, we are interested in the existence of ideal
non-perfect SSSs based on min-entropies for non-uniform
probability distribution of the secret. Surprisingly, we will
prove that there actually exists such a non-uniform probability
distribution of the secret realizing the ideal non-perfect (k, n)-
threshold SSS based on min-entropies.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we provide a formal model and security definition
of SSSs based on Re´nyi entropies for general access structures.
Under such a model and security definitions, we derive the
lower bound of share sizes measured by average conditional
min-entropies in Section III, by proving the extended lower
bound based on Re´nyi entropies. Sections IV and V are
devoted to construct SSSs based on min-entropies. In Section
IV, we show the existence of non-perfect SSSs based on min-
entropies for arbitrary distribution on binary secret and for
arbitrary monotone access structures. Then, it is clarified in
Section V that an ideal non-perfect (k, n)-threshold SSS based
on min-entropies exists for non-uniform distribution of the
secret. Technical proofs of Theorems 3 and 4 are provided
in Appendices A and B, respectively.
II. MODEL AND SECURITY DEFINITION
Let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite set of IDs of n users.
For every i ∈ [n], let Vi be a finite set of possible shares of the
user i, and denote by PVi its associated probability distribution
on Vi. Similarly, let S be a finite set of secret information and
PS be its associated probability distribution. In the following,
for any subset U := {i1, i2, . . . , iu} ⊂ [n], we use the notation
vU := {vi1 , vi2 , . . . , viu} and VU := {Vi1 , Vi2 , . . . , Viu}.
For a finite set X , let P(X ) be the family of probability
distributions defined on X .
A. Access Structures
In SSSs, we normally assume that each set of shares is
classified into either a qualified set or a forbidden set. A
qualified set is the set of shares that can recover the secret.
On the other hand, the secret must be kept secret against
any collusion of members of a forbidden set in the sense
of information theoretic security, the meaning of which will
be formally specified later. Let Q ⊂ 2[n] and F ⊂ 2[n] be
families of qualified and forbidden sets, respectively. Then we
call Γ := (Q,F ) an access structure. In particular, the access
structure is called (k, n)-threshold access structure if it satis-
fies that Q := {Q : |Q| ≥ k} and F := {F : |F| ≤ k − 1}.
In this paper, we assume that the access structure is a partition
of 2[n], namely, Q ∪F = 2[n] and Q ∩F = ∅.
An access structure is said to be monotone if it satisfies
that for all Q ∈ Q, every Q′ ⊃ Q satisfies Q′ ∈ Q and;
for all F ∈ F , every F ′ ⊂ F satisfies F ′ ∈ F . In addition,
we define the maximal forbidden sets as F+ := {F ∈ F |
F ∪ {i} ∈ Q, for all i ∈ [n]\F}. Clearly, the monotone
property is necessary condition for the existence of secret
sharing schemes. Furthermore, it is proved that this property
is actually sufficient for the existence of SSSs [12].
B. Secret Sharing Schemes for General Access Structures
Let Π = ([PS ], Πshare, Πcomb) be a secret sharing scheme
for an access structure Γ , as defined below:
• [PS ] is a sampling algorithm for secret information, and
it outputs a secret s ∈ S according to a probability
distribution PS ;
• Πshare is a randomized algorithm for generating shares
for all users, and it is executed by a honest entity called
dealer. It takes a secret s ∈ S on input and outputs
(v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈
∏n
i=1 Vi; and
• Πcomb is an algorithm for recovering a secret. It takes a
set of shares vQ, Q ∈ Q, on input and outputs a secret
s ∈ S.
In this paper, we assume that Π meets perfect correctness:
for any possible secret s ∈ S, and for all possible shares
(v1, v2, . . . , vn) ← Πshare(s), it holds that Πcomb(vQ) = s
for any subset Q ∈ Q.
C. Information Measures and Security Criteria
In information theoretic cryptography, information measures
play a significant role since it is used to define the security
as well as to measure the share sizes. In this paper, we are
interested in Re´nyi entropy and its conditional one since Re´nyi
entropies include several useful entropy measures as special
cases.
For a non-negative real number α and a random variable X
taking its values on a finite set X , Re´nyi entropy of order α
with respect to X is defined as [14]
Rα(X) :=
1
1− α
log
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
α. (1)
It is well known several entropy measures are special cases
of Re´nyi entropy. For instance, Shannon entropy H(X) :=
−
∑
x∈X PX(x) logPX(x) and min-entropy R∞(X) :=
− logmaxx∈X PX(x) are derived as special cases of Rα(X)
by letting α→ 1 and α→∞, respectively.
In addition, for a non-negative real number α and random
variables X and Y taking values on finite sets X and Y ,
respectively, conditional Re´nyi entropy of order α with respect
to X given Y is defined as [15]
Rα(X |Y )
:=
α
1− α
log
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)
{∑
x∈X
PX|Y (x|y)
α
}1/α
. (2)
Note that there are many definitions of conditional Re´nyi
entropies [8, 16]. There are two reasons why we choose the
definition (2) of conditional Re´nyi entropy. The first reason
is that it is connected to the cryptographically important
conditional min-entropy R∞ (·|·) (e.g., see [17]) defined as
R∞ (X |Y ) := − log
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)max
x∈X
PX|Y (x|y) (3)
which plays a crucial role in this paper. We note that the
relation R∞ (X |Y ) = limα→∞Rα(X |Y ) holds [8].
The second reason is that it satisfies the very useful prop-
erties similar to Shannon entropy as shown below:
Proposition 1 ([8, 15, 18]): Let X , Y , and Z be random
variables taking values on finite sets X , Y , and Z , respectively.
Then, for arbitrary α ∈ [0,∞] we have:
(A) Conditioned Monotonicity:
(i) Rα(X |Z) ≤ Rα(XY |Z), and
(ii) Rα(X |Z) = Rα(XY |Z) holds if and only if Y =
f(X,Z) for some (deterministic) mapping f .
(B) Conditioning Reduces Entropy: Rα(X) ≥ Rα(X |Y )
where the equality holds if X and Y are statistically
independent.
Note that the properties (A)–(i) and (B) are proved in
[18] and [15], respectively. The property (A)–(ii) is explicitly
pointed out in [8].
Based on the above foundations of (conditional) Re´nyi
entropies, we give security formalization for a secret sharing
scheme for an access structure Γ as follows.
Definition 1 (Security based on Re´nyi entropies): Let Π
be a secret sharing scheme for an access structure Γ . Then,
Π is said to meet ǫ-security with respect to Rα(·|·), if for
any forbidden set F ∈ F it satisfies
Rα(S)−Rα(S|VF ) ≤ ǫ. (4)
In particular, Π is said to meet perfect security with respect
to Rα(·|·) if ǫ = 0 above.
For simplicity we abbreviate ǫ-security with respect to
Rα(·|·) as (Rα(·|·), ǫ)-security, and perfect security with re-
spect to Rα(·|·) as Rα(·|·)-security.
Note that Definition 1 includes the security of SSSs based
on several types of entropies as special cases. In particular,
we are interested in the case of α → 1 and α → ∞ which
define ǫ-security with respect to H(·|·) and R∞(·|·), i.e., the
security based on Shannon and min entropies, respectively.
Finally, we note that, if a SSS is H(·|·)-secure, i.e., perfectly
secure, it is R∞(·|·)-secure as well. Hence, in this paper, we
are mainly interested in the SSS satisfying R∞(·|·)-security
but not satisfying H(·|·)-security. Such a SSS is called non-
perfect SSS [11], which is formally defined as follows:
Definition 2 ([11]): If there exists a set of F ⊂ [n] satisfy-
ing Hα(S) > Hα(S|VF ), it is called a non-perfect SSS.
III. UNIFIED PROOFS FOR LOWER BOUNDS
OF SHARE SIZES IN SSSS
We begin with this section by reviewing the following well-
known tight lower bound of SSSs for arbitrary access structure
Γ meeting (H(·|·), ǫ)-secure SSSs.
Proposition 2 ([19, 20]): Let Π be an H(·|·)-secure secret
sharing scheme for an access structure Γ . Then, for every
i ∈ [n], it holds that
H(Vi) ≥ H(S) and |Vi| ≥ |S|. (5)
Note that (5) is proved for threshold access structures and
general access structures in [19] and [20], respectively. From
Proposition 2, we define that the secret sharing scheme Π is
called ideal if Π satisfies (5) with equalities.
As is shown in Proposition 2, we note that the SSSs based
on Shannon entropy are well studied. On the other hand, there
is no study on a SSS based on min-entropy, which is the
main topic of this paper. Noticing the fact that Re´nyi entropy
is a generalization of Shannon, min, and several kinds of
entropies, it is fruitful to derive the lower bounds of share sizes
of (Rα(·|·), ǫ)-secure SSSs, i.e., in terms of Re´nyi entropies,
in a comprehensive way. Then, we can directly prove that
the lower bounds of share sizes of (R∞(·|·), ǫ)-secure SSSs
as a corollary. The following theorem can be considered as
an extension of impossibility result with respect to key sizes
measured by Re´nyi entropy discussed in [8] in symmetric-key
cryptography to the impossibility result with respect to SSSs.
Theorem 1: Let Π be a secret sharing scheme for an access
structure Γ which meets (Rα(·|·), ǫ)-security. Then, it holds
that, for arbitrary α ∈ [0,∞],
Rα(Vi) ≥ Rα(S)− ǫ (6)
for every i ∈ [n].
Proof. For any i ∈ [n], there exists a for bidden set F ∈ F
such that i 6∈ F and F ∪ {i} ∈ Q. Then, we have
Rα(S) ≤ Rα(S|VF ) + ǫ
(a)
≤ Rα(SVi|VF ) + ǫ
(b)
= Rα(Vi|VF ) + ǫ
(c)
≤ Rα(Vi) + ǫ, (7)
where (a) follows from Proposition 1 (A)–(i), (b) follows from
Proposition 1 (A)–(ii) since Π meets perfect correctness, and
(c) follows from Proposition 1 (B). ✷
In the case of Rα(·|·)-security, i.e., ǫ = 0, the following
corollary obviously holds.
Corollary 1: For arbitrarily fixed α ∈ [0,∞], let Π be
a secret sharing scheme for an access structure Γ meeting
Rα(·|·)-security. Then, it holds that Rα(Vi) ≥ Rα(S) for
every i ∈ [n].
Hence, we can immediately obtain the following corollary
with respect to the lower bound of share sizes measured by
min-entropy under R∞ (·|·)-security by letting α → ∞ in
Corollary 1.
Corollary 2: Let Π be a secret sharing scheme for an
access structure Γ meeting R∞ (·|·)-security. Then, it holds
that R∞(Vi) ≥ R∞(S) for every i ∈ [n].
Moreover, noting that Rα(S|VF ) = Rα(S) holds for
arbitrary α ∈ [0,∞] if the random variables S and VF are
statistically independent2, i.e., H(S|VF ) = H(S). Hence, we
can prove that the lower bounds of share sizes of SSSs with
H(·|·)-security.
Corollary 3: Let Π be a secret sharing scheme for an
access structure Γ meeting H(·|·)-security. Then, it holds for
arbitrary α ∈ [0,∞] that Rα(Vi) ≥ Rα(S), i ∈ [n].
Hence, Proposition 2 is immediately obtained from Corol-
lary 3 as a special cases of Corollary 3 by taking the limits
α→ 1 and α→ 0.
2However, as will be shown in Sections IV and V, we note the converse
of this implication is not always true.
In a similar manner, we can also obtain the following
corollary with respect to the lower bound of share sizes
measured by min-entropy under traditional H(·|·)-security by
letting α→∞ in Corollary 3.
Corollary 4: Let Π be a secret sharing scheme for an
access structure Γ meeting H(·|·)-security. Then, it holds that
R∞(Vi) ≥ R∞(S) for every i ∈ [n].
Remark 1: Recently, Alimomeni and Safavi-Naini [5]
proved that the key size in symmetric-key encryption must
be equal to or larger than the message size if these sizes are
measured by min-entropy and the security criteria is based
on R∞(·|·). Similarly, Dodis [6] proved that the key size in
symmetric-key encryption3 must be equal to or larger than
the message size if these sizes are measured by min-entropy
and the security criteria is based on H(·|·). Hence, Corollaries
2 and 4 can be considered as SSS versions of [5] and [6],
respectively.
Remark 2: All discussions in Sections II and III are valid
if we replace Rα(·|·) with the conditional Re´nyi entropy pro-
posed by Hayashi [21]. In this case, the only difference is the
resulting conditional min-entropy defined as Rwst∞ (X |Y ) :=
− logmax(x,y)∈X×Y PX|Y (x|y). However, even if we give
the security definition based on Hayashi’s conditional Re´nyi
entropy, we can also prove Theorem 1 in the same way.
IV. EXISTENCE OF NON-PERFECT SSSS BASED ON
MIN-ENTROPIES FOR GENERAL ACCESS STRUCTURES
Hereafter, we are concerned with the existence of SSSs
satisfying R∞(·|·)-security. Recalling the discussion on Defi-
nition 2, we are concerned with a R∞ (·|·)-secure non-perfect
SSS, since, if a SSS is perfectly secure, it is R∞(·|·)-secure as
well. Note that non-perfect SSSs are meaningless if the secret
if deterministic since H(S) = 0 in such a case. Hence, we
assume that the secret is not deterministic in the following
discussion.
In this section, we address the existence of non-perfect
SSS satisfying R∞ (·|·)-security for arbitrary monotone access
structure Γ .
A. Existence of Non-perfect SSS Based on Min-entropies
Combining the results [12] and [13], there exist SSSs satis-
fying H(·|·)-security for arbitrary monotone access structure
and for arbitrary probability distribution of secret information.
However, it is not known whether this fact is still valid
or not for non-perfect SSSs satisfying R∞(·|·)-security. We
obtain a positive result for such a question, summarized as
the following theorem:
Theorem 2: For an arbitrary binary and non-uniform prob-
ability distribution PS(·) ∈ P({0, 1}) of secret information,
there exists a non-perfect SSS with R∞ (·|·)-security with an
arbitrary monotone access structure Γ = (Q,F ).
3Note that the probabilistic encryption is considered in the result by Dodis
while only deterministic encryption is discussed in the result by Alimomeni
and Safavi-Naini. In SSSs, we do not care such a difference since Πshare
(i.e., the encryption function of SSSs) is randomized in nature.
Proof. Let PS(·) ∈ P({0, 1}) be an arbitrarily fixed non-
uniform probability distribution of the binary secret. For a
given monotone access structure Γ = (Q,F ), let F+ :=
{F1,F2, . . . ,Fm} where m := |F+|.
Suppose that we can generate a set of shares denoted
by {w1, w2, . . . , wm} of non-perfect (m,m)-threshold SSS
for the secret s ∈ {0, 1} satisfying R∞ (·|·)-security. The
construction of such (m,m)-threshold SSS based on min-
entropies will be provided in Construction Π1. For j ∈ [m],
let Wj be the random variable taking its values on a finite set
Wj , which corresponds to wj .
Consider a cumulative map [12] ϕF : [n] → 2[m] given
by ϕF (i) := {j | i 6∈ Fj ∈ F+} for i ∈ [n], and define
ϕF (U) :=
⋃
i∈U ϕ
F (i) for U ⊂ [n]. Then, it is proved in
[12] that ∣∣ϕF (U)∣∣ ≥ m, if U ∈ Q (8)∣∣ϕF (U)∣∣ ≤ m− 1, if U ∈ F . (9)
Now, we assume that each share vi for the SSS with the
access structure Γ consists of a set of wj . Specifically, let
vi := {wj | j ∈ ϕF (i)}. Then, the secret s can be recovered
from a qualified set Q ⊂ [n] due to (8). On the other hand,
we have
R∞ (S|VF ) = R∞
(
S|WϕF (F)
)
= R∞(S) (10)
holds for arbitrary F ∈ F where the first equality holds from
the definition of vi, and the second equality is due to (9) and
R∞ (·|·)-security for the non-perfect (m,m)-threshold SSS. ✷
Remark 3: Similar argument also holds by combining
monotone circuit construction [22] with (n, n)-threshold non-
perfect SSS with R∞ (·|·)-security, which is omitted here.
Hence, the remaining to prove Theorem 2 is the construction
of a non-perfect (n, n)-threshold SSS satisfying R∞ (·|·)-
security for arbitrary non-uniform probability distribution
PS(·) ∈ P({0, 1}).
B. Construction of Non-perfect (n, n)-threshold SSS Based on
Min-entropies for Arbitrary Binary Secret Information
Construction Π1: Let S, and V1, V2, . . . , Vn be binary random
variables. Assume that S and V1, V2, . . . , Vn−1 are statistically
independent and they satisfy PS(0) = PV1(0) = · · · =
PVn−1(0) = p, for 1/2 < p < 1. Then, we generate Vn by
Vn := S⊕V1⊕V2⊕· · ·⊕Vn−1 where ⊕ denotes the exclusive
OR operation.
Theorem 3: The construction Π1 realizes
R∞ (S) = R∞ (Vi) = − log p for i ∈ [n− 1], (11)
R∞ (Vn) = − log{p
2 + (1− p)2}, (12)
and
R∞ (S|VF ) = − log p for F ⊂ [n] s.t. |F| = n− 1. (13)
Hence, the construction Π1 is a non-perfect (n, n)-threshold
SSS which meets R∞(·|·)-security.
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
Remark 4: The above construction Π1 works in the cases
of p = 1/2, 1. In both cases, the random variables S and VF in
the construction Π1 are statistically independent, and hence,
they result in (n, n)-threshold SSSs satisfying H(·|·)-security.
On the other hand, if the random variables S and VF in
the construction Π1 are not statistically independent if n ∈
F since p 6= 1/2, 1. Therefore, Π1 is a non-perfect (n, n)-
threshold SSS while it satisfies R(·|·)-security.
Remark 5: As we will see in Section V, there exists a
specific probability distribution of the secret that realizes a
non-perfect SSS satisfying R∞ (·|·)-security for an arbitrary
monotone access structure Γ = (Q,F ) even if the set S
is non-binary. However, it is an open problem to construct a
non-perfect SSS for Γ satisfying R∞ (·|·)-security for arbitrary
probability distribution PS on S if |S| ≥ 3.
Now, we analyze the efficiency of the protocol Π1. Note
that in the case of ordinary SSSs satisfying H(·|·)-security,
the SSS satisfying H(Vi) = H(S) for all i ∈ [n] is called
ideal since such a SSS is considered to be optimal in terms
of share sizes due to (5) in Proposition 2.
In our problem setting, we can use Corollary 2 to define the
ideal SSS for R∞(·|·)-security.
Definition 3 (Ideal SSS based on Min-entropies): A SSS
Π meeting R∞ (·|·)-security is called ideal if Π satisfies
R∞(Vi) = R∞(S) for arbitrary i ∈ [n].
Based on the above definition, the share sizes in Π1 are
“almost” ideal in the sense that R∞(Vi) = R∞(S) for i ∈ [n−
1], but R∞(Vn) > R∞(S). In order to obtain (fully) ideal SSS
which meets R∞(·|·)-security, the parameter p must satisfy
− log(p2+(1−p)2) = − log p because of R∞ (S) = R∞ (Vn),
and we have p = 1/2, 1. However, each of p = 1/2, 1 makes
Π1 to be H(·|·)-secure as pointed out in Remark 4 (and hence,
we assume p 6= 1/2, 1 in Π1). Namely, Π1 cannot realize
ideal non-prefect R∞ (·|·)-secure SSSs while it is applicable
to arbitrary probability distribution of binary secret.
Summarizing, although the protocol Π1 is applicable to
arbitrary binary probability distribution of the secret, it has
the following problems; Π1 is designed for (n, n)-threshold
schemes with binary secrets, and; Π1 cannot realize ideal non-
prefect SSSs satisfying R∞ (·|·)-security.
V. EXISTENCE OF IDEAL NON-PERFECT
(k, n)-THRESHOLD SSS BASED ON MIN-ENTROPIES
From the discussion at the end of the last section, we show
that there exist an ideal non-perfect (k, n)-threshold SSSs sat-
isfying R∞ (·|·)-security with specific non-uniform probability
distributions of a secret S over arbitrary finite field S. This
result implies the essential difference between R∞ (·|·)- and
H(·|·)-security since it is proved in [13, Theorem 7] that ideal
H(·|·)-secure SSS is realized only when S is uniform.
Construction Π2: For a finite field Ft with a prime power t,
generate a set
DT(k,n) :=
{
(s, v1, v2, . . . , vn) | vi = s+
k−1∑
ℓ=1
iℓrℓ,
(s, r1, r2, . . . , rk−1) ∈ (Ft)
k
}
⊂ (Ft)
n+1 (14)
called distribution table [23], where we assume that each i ∈
[n] in (14) is appropriately encoded so as to be regarded as
[n] ⊂ Ft. Let S, and V1, V2, . . . , Vn be random variables with
joint probability given by
PSV1V2···Vn(s, v1, v2, . . . , vn)
=


p, if (s, v1, v2, . . . , vn) = (0, 0, . . . , 0),
1− p
tk − 1
, if (s, v1, v2, . . . , vn) 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0)
and (s, v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ DT(k,n),
0, if (s, v1, v2, . . . , vn) 6∈ DT(k,n).
(15)
where p ≥ 1/tk.
Remark 6: Let ϕ : (Ft)k → (Ft)n+1 be the mapping de-
fined by ϕ((s, r1, r2, . . . , rk−1)) = (s, v1, v2, . . . , vn) where
s, r1, r2, . . . , rk−1 and v1, v2, . . . , vn are specified in (14).
Then, it is seen that ϕ is injective due to the Lagrange interpo-
lation, ϕ((0, 0, . . . , 0)) = (0, 0, . . . , 0), and Imϕ = DT(k,n).
Hence, we have |DT(k,n)| = tk. From this fact, it is easy to
see that (15) actually forms a probability distribution.
Theorem 4: In the above construction Π2, it holds for
arbitrary F ⊂ [n] satisfying |F| = k − 1 that
R∞(S|VF ) = R∞(S)
= R∞(V1) = · · · = R∞(Vn)
= − log
ptk + (1− p)tk−1 − 1
tk − 1
, (16)
which means that, for every integers k and n, and for arbitrary
finite field of secret information, there exists a non-uniform
distribution PS(·) ∈ P(S) to realize an ideal non-perfect
R∞ (·|·)-secure SSS.
Proof. See Appendix B. ✷
Remark 7: In SSSs satisfying H(·|·)-security, the ideal one
exists only in the cases that the distribution of a secret is
uniform or deterministic, and hence, H(S) = H(Vi) = log |S|
or H(S) = H(Vi) = 0 is allowed in ideal H(·|·)-secure SSSs.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that, for every 0 ≤
R ≤ log |S|, there exists an ideal non-perfect SSS satisfying
R∞ (·|·)-security that attains R = R∞(S).
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3
First, we show (11) and (12). It is easy to see that R∞(S)
= R∞(V1) = · · · = R∞(Vn−1) = − log p. Noticing that
Vn = S ⊕ V1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Vn−1, it holds that S ⊕ V1 = Vn, and
hence, we have PVn(0) = p2 + q2 where q := 1 − p. Since
p ≥ q, we obtain R∞(Vn) = − log(p2 + q2).
In the remaining of this proof, we check (13). Since
R∞(X |Y ) satisfies Corollary 1 (A), it is sufficient to show
R∞(S|VF ) = R∞(S) only in the case of |F| = n− 1.
Consider the case where n 6∈ F . In this case, it is easy to
see that
PS|V1V2···Vn−1(s|v1, v2, . . . , vn−1) = PS(s)
holds since S and V1, V2, . . . , Vn−1 are independent. Hence,
R∞(S|VF ) = R∞(S) obviously holds in this case.
Next, we consider the case of n ∈ F . From the sym-
metricity, it is sufficient to consider the case where F =
{2, 3, . . . , n}. For simplicity of notation, define4 v := vF\{n}
and V := VF\{n}. Let σ : {0, 1}n−2 → {0, 1} be the mapping
that computes exclusive OR of all inputs. Due to the construc-
tion and the independency among S and V1, V2, . . . , Vn−1, the
probability PVF (vF ) = PV Vn(v, vn) can be calculated in the
following cases:
Case 1): σ(v) ⊕ vn = 1, i.e., (σ(v), vn) = (0, 1) or
(σ(v), vn) = (1, 0):
PV Vn(v, vn) = PSV1V (1, 0,v) + PSV V (0, 1,v)
= 2pqPV (v) (17)
Case 2): σ(v) ⊕ vn = 0, i.e., (σ(v), vn) = (0, 0) or
(σ(v), vn) = (1, 1):
PV Vn(v, vn) = PSV1V (0, 0,v) + PSV1V (1, 1,v)
= (p2 + q2)PV (v) (18)
Furthermore, note that the following relation:
PS|V Vn(s|v, vn) = PSV1|V Vn(s, 1|v, vn)
+ PSV1|V Vn(s, 0|v, vn). (19)
Now, consider Case 1). In this case it is easy to see that
PSV1|V Vn(0, 1|v, vn) = PSV1|V Vn(1, 0|v, vn) =
1
2
, (20)
and
PSV1|V Vn(0, 0|v, vn) = PSV1|V Vn(1, 1|v, vn) = 0. (21)
Hence, (19) becomes PS|V Vn(s|v, vn) = 1/2, which leads to
PV Vn(v, vn)max
s
PS|V Vn(s|v, vn) = pq · PV (v). (22)
Next, consider Case 2). In this case, it is easy to see that
PSV1|V Vn(0, 1|v, vn) = PSV1|V (1, 0|v, vn) = 0
and hence, (19) becomes
max
s
PS|V Vn(s|v, vn)
= max
{
PSV1|V Vn(0, 0|v, vn), PSV1|V Vn(1, 1|v, vn)
}
.
(23)
4In the case of n = 2, we set v = ∅ and V = ∅.
Here, PSV1|V Vn(0, 0|v, vn) can be calculated as follows:
PSV1|V Vn(0, 0|v, vn) =
PSV1V Vn(0, 0,v, vn)
PV (v, vn)
=
PSV1(0, 0)PV (v)
PV (v, vn)
=
p2
p2 + q2
(24)
Similarly, we have PSV1|V Vn(1, 1|v, vn) = q2/(p2 + q2).
Hence, because of p ≥ q, (23) becomes
PV Vn(v, vn)max
s
PS|V (s|v) = p
2 · PV (v). (25)
Summarizing (22) and (25), we have∑
v,vn
PV Vn(v, vn)maxs
PS|V Vn(s|v, vn)
=
∑
v:σ(v)=0
vn=1
∑
v:σ(v)=1
vn=0
pqPV (v) +
∑
v:σ(v)=0
vn=0
∑
v:σ(v)=1
vn=1
p2PV (v)
=
∑
v:σ(v)=0,1
(pq + p2)PV (v) = p. (26)
Hence, we obtain R∞(S|VF ) = R∞(S) = − log p, which
completes the proof. ✷
B. Proof of Theorem 4
Since the joint probability of (S, V1, V2, . . . , Vn) is 1−ptk−1
except the case where S, V1, V2, . . . , Vn are all 0, it is easy
to see that
PS(0) = PV1(0) = PV2(0) = · · · = PVn(0)
= p+ (tk−1 − 1)
1− p
tk − 1
= p−
1− p
tk − 1
+ tk−1
1− p
tk − 1
=
ptk + (1− p)tk−1 − 1
tk − 1
(27)
PS(z) = PV1(z) = PV2(z) = · · · = PVn(z)
= tk−1
1− p
tk − 1
, for z ∈ [t− 1] (28)
Here we note that p ≥ 1/tk implies that p ≥ 1−p
tk−1
.
Comparing with (27) and (28) taking p ≥ 1−p
tk−1
into account, it
is easy to see that PS(0) ≥ PS(z) as well as PVi(0) ≥ PVi(z),
i ∈ [n], for arbitrary z ∈ F+t := Ft\{0}. Hence, we have
R∞(S) = R∞(V1) = · · · = R∞(Vn)
= − log
ptk + (1− p)tk−1 − 1
tk − 1
(29)
Now, we calculate H(S|VF) where we assume that VF :=
{V1, V2, . . . , Vk−1} without loss of generality.
First, we consider the case where (v1, v2, . . . , vk−1) =
(0, 0, . . . , 0) is the condition. In the case, we have
PV1V2···Vk−1(0, 0, . . . , 0) = p+ (t− 1)
1− p
tk − 1
and we denote this probability by R(p, t, k) for simplicity.
Hence, we have
PS|V1V2···Vn−1(s|0, 0, . . . , 0)
=
{
p/R(p, t, k), if s = 0
1−p
tk−1
/R(p, t, k), if s = 1 (30)
which results in maxs∈Ft PS|V1V2···Vt−1(s|0, 0, . . . , 0) =
p/R(p, t, k) since we assume that p ≥ 1/tk.
On the other hand, consider the case of (v1, v2, . . . , vk−1) 6=
(0, 0, . . . , 0). In this case, we have
PV1V2···Vk−1(v1, v2, . . . , vk−1) = t
1− p
tk − 1
. (31)
and hence, it holds that
PS|V1V2···Vn−1(s|v1, v2, . . . , vk−1) =
1
t
(32)
and hence, we obtain maxs PS|V1V2···Vn−1(s|v1, v2, . . . , vn−1)
= 1/t.
Summarizing, we have
H(S|V1V2 · · ·Vn−1)
= − log
{
p
/
R(p, t, k)×R(p, t, k)
+
1
t
× t
1− p
tk − 1
× (tk−1 − 1)
}
= − log
{
p+ (tk−1 − 1)
1− p
tk − 1
}
= − log
ptk + (1− p)tk−1 − 1
tk − 1
. (33)
